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Abstract This paper presents a delay-tolerant mix-zone framework for protecting the
location privacy of mobile users against continuous query correlation attacks. First,
we describe and analyze the continuous query correlation attacks (CQ-attacks) that
perform query correlation based inference to break the anonymity of road network-
aware mix-zones.We formally study the privacy strengths of the mix-zone anonymiza-
tion under the CQ-attack model and argue that spatial cloaking or temporal cloak-
ing over road network mix-zones is ineffective and susceptible to attacks that carry
out inference by combining query correlation with timing correlation (CQ-timing
attack) and transition correlation (CQ-transition attack) information. Next, we in-
troduce three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones (i.e., temporal, spatial
and spatio-temporal) that are free from CQ-timing and CQ-transition attacks and in
contrast to conventional mix-zones, perform a combination of both location mixing
and identity mixing of spatially and temporally perturbed user locations to achieve
stronger anonymity under the CQ-attack model. We show that by combining tempo-
ral and spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones, we can obtain the strongest anonymity for
continuous queries while making acceptable tradeoff between anonymous query pro-
cessing cost and temporal delay incurred in anonymous query processing. We eval-
uate the proposed techniques through extensive experiments conducted on realistic
traces produced by GTMobiSim on different scales of geographic maps. Our exper-
iments show that the proposed techniques offer high level of anonymity and attack
resilience to continuous queries.
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1 Introduction
Continuous location-based queries are gaining growing interests and attentions in
both mobile data management research and mobile service industry. Examples of
continuous queries (CQs) include “informing me the nearest gas stations coming up
along the highway I-85 south every 1 minute in the next 30 minutes” or “show me the
restaurants within 2 miles every two minutes during the next hour”. Many consider
continuous spatial queries as a fundamental building block for continuous provision-
ing of location services to mobile users traveling on the roads.
Continuous query attacks (CQ-attacks) refer to the query correlation attacks. Con-
cretely, a CQ represents a time series of query evaluations of the same query within
a given validity time window. For example, if Alice is traveling on I-85 south and
requested a CQ service: show me the restaurants within 2 miles every two minutes
during the next hour, then the CQ server will process this CQ as a standing query for
1 hour period upon its installation and it will consists of a sequence of 30 evaluations
along the trajectory of Alice. The CQ-attack refers to the risk that an adversary can
perform inference attacks by correlating the semantic continuity in the time series
of query evaluations of the same CQ and the inherent trajectory of locations. In this
paper we show that such CQ-attacks can intrude location privacy of mobile users
(i.e., exposing the identity of Alice), even though the locations of mobile users are
anonymized through well-known location anonymization techniques.
A fair amount of research efforts have been dedicated to protecting location pri-
vacy of mobile travelers. We can broadly classify the state of art research and de-
velopment results into two categories. The first category is represented by location
cloaking techniques [20,7,17,26,32]. Spatial location cloaking typically adds uncer-
tainty to the location information exposed to the location query services by increasing
the spatial resolution of a mobile user’s locations while meeting location k-anonymity
and/or location l-diversity [7]. More specifically, the spatially cloaked region is con-
structed to ensure that at least k users (location k anonymity) are located in the same
region, which contains l different static sensitive objects (locations). Spatial cloaking
is effective for snapshot queries but vulnerable to CQ-attacks. The second class of lo-
cation anonymization techniques is represented by mix-zone development [9,15,16,
11,29]. Mix-zones are spatial regions where a set of users enter, change pseudonyms
in such a way that the mapping between their old and new pseudonyms is not re-
vealed. Also inside a mix-zone, no applications can track user movements. Mix-zones
break the continuity of location exposure by introducing uncertainty such that it is
very hard to perform correlation attacks to link old pseudonym with new pseudonym
of mobile users. However, neither spatial cloaking nor mix-zone techniques are re-
silient to CQ attacks as they are vulnerable to query correlation. Concretely, with spa-
tial cloaking, an adversary can infer user movement by performing query correlation
attacks over the adjacent or overlapped cloaking boxes. Similarly, mobile users re-
questing CQ services are vulnerable under CQ-attacks even though their movements
on the road networks are protected by mix-zone anonymization. With these problems
in mind, in this paper we present a delay-tolerant mix-zone framework for protect-
ing location privacy of mobile users with continuous query services in a mobile en-
vironment. First, we describe and analyze the continuous query correlation attacks
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(CQ-attacks) that perform query correlation based inference to break the anonymity
of road network-aware mix-zones. We formally study the privacy strengths of the
mix-zone anonymization under the CQ-attack model and identify that providing high
initial anonymity in the mix-zone model is the key to anonymizing continuous queries
in a mix-zone framework. We argue that spatial cloaking or temporal cloaking over
road network mix-zones is ineffective and susceptible to attacks that carry out infer-
ence by combining query correlation with timing correlation (CQ-timing attack) and
transition correlation (CQ-transition attack) information.
Next, we introduce three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones (i.e.,
temporal, spatial and spatio-temporal) that are free fromCQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks and in contrast to conventional mix-zones, perform a combination of both lo-
cation mixing and identity mixing of spatially and temporally perturbed user loca-
tions to achieve stronger anonymity under the CQ-attack model. In the delay-tolerant
mix-zone model, users expose spatially or temporally perturbed locations outside the
mix-zone area. However, on the exit of each temporal delay tolerant mix-zone, the
mix-zone changes their perturbed locations by introducing a random temporal shift
to their already perturbed locations. Similarly, the spatial delay tolerant mix-zones in-
troduce a random spatial shift to the spatially perturbed locations when the users exit
them. While conventional mix-zones only change pseudonyms inside them, the ad-
ditional ability of delay-tolerant mix-zones to change and mix user locations brings
greater opportunities for creating anonymity. Our third type of delay tolerant mix-
zones, namely spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones effectively combine tempo-
ral delay-tolerant and spatial delay tolerant mix-zones to obtain the highest anonymity
for continuous queries while making acceptable tradeoff between anonymous query
processing cost and temporal delay incurred in anonymous query processing. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically study the benefits
of combining location perturbation based techniques with mix-zone based location
anonymization schemes for protecting against continuous query attacks. We evaluate
the proposed techniques through extensive experiments conducted using traces pro-
duced by GTMobiSim [28] on different scales of geographic maps. Our experiments
show that the delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques are efficient and offer the desired
level of anonymity for continuous queries.
2 Related work
Location privacy has been studied over the past decade along two orthogonal dimen-
sions: spatial cloaking through location k-anonymity represented by [17,26,7,32,13,
6] and mix-zone based privacy protection and its variations represented by [9,15,
16,11,29,25]. However, these approaches are suitable only for snapshot queries and
are inadequate and ineffective for protecting location privacy of mobile users with
continuous query services.
In recent years, there had been research efforts that dealt with location privacy
risks of continuous queries. [10] describes various attacks in Location-based sys-
tems, including the continuous query attacks and the challenges of supporting con-
tinuous query services. [12] proposes spatial cloaking using the memorization prop-
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erty for continuous queries. This is further used in [30] for clustering queries with
similar mobility patterns. However, this type of techniques may lead to large cloak-
ing boxes resulting in higher query processing cost as users may not always move
together. [14] identifies that location cloaking algorithms with only k-anonymity
and l-diversity guarantee are not effective for continuous LBS and therefore propose
query m-invariance as a necessary criterion when dealing with continuous location
queries. However,m-invariance based approach is ineffective when the mobile users
ask uniquely different CQ services as they move on the road. An alternative thread
of research is represented by the Personal information retrieval techniques as an al-
ternate to location cloaking for anonymous query processing [19]. PIR techniques
guarantee privacy of mobile users regardless of which types of queries (continuous
or snapshot) they ask. However PIR based solutions are known to be expensive in
both computation and storage overheads, even with the recent new techniques such
as hardware-assisted PIR techniques [34], developed to improve the scalability and
efficiency of the PIR approach. Another general issue with PIR based solutions is its
limitation in terms of what kinds of queries can be protected under PIR [33].
The concept of mix-zones was first presented in the context of location privacy in
[9]. The idea of building mix-zones at road intersections is proposed in [15] and [11].
In [16], a formulation for optimal placement of mix-zones in a road map is discussed.
Almost all existing mix-zone techniques follow a straight forward approach of using a
rectangular or circular shaped zone and their construction methodologies do not take
into account the effect of timing and transition attacks in the construction process.
The MobiMix framework presented in [29] is the first road-network aware attack-
resilient mix-zone that guarantees an expected value of anonymity by leveraging the
characteristics of both the underlying road network and motion behaviors of users
traveling on spatially constrained road networks. However, all existing road network
mix-zone approaches, to the best of our knowledge, fail to protect mobile users from
continuous query attacks.
Inspired by the mix-zone concept, the Cachecloak algorithm [25] employs an
alternate technique for path-mixing by using cache prefetching to hide the exact lo-
cation of mobile user by requesting the location based data along an entire predicted
path. Although these techniques are effective when all users obtain the same service,
they are vulnerable to continuous query correlation attacks when the mobile users ob-
tain uniquely different CQ services. Recently, content caching[5] has been proposed
as an alternate solution to location privacy. However, caching large amounts of in-
formation on tiny mobile devices may not be effective. In addition, they may limit
the usability of the services by restricting mobile clients to ask only services that are
cached before-hand.
In this paper, we introduce delay-tolerant road-network mix-zones as an effective
countermeasure against CQ attacks. We show that by performing a combination of
both location mixing and identity mixing in the mix-zones, the delay-tolerant mix-
zones offer greater level of anonymity that is sufficient to meet the anonymity levels
of continuous queries under the CQ-attack model while maintaining acceptable qual-
ity of continuous query services. Though both location perturbation based techniques
and mix-zone anonymization are well researched topics by themselves, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically study the benefits of combining
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location perturbation based techniques with mix-zone based location anonymization
schemes to tackle sophisticated attacks such as the continuous query attacks. In gen-
eral, we believe that an effective combination of location perturbation with mix-zone
based techniques has the potential to provide the strongest defense against the sophis-
ticated CQ attacks.
3 Mix-zones and CQ-attacks
In this section, we introduce the basic mix-zone concepts, illustrate the vulnerabili-
ties of mix-zones to continuous query correlation attacks (CQ-attacks) and present a
formal analysis of the continuous query anonymization problem.
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Fig. 1: Mix-zone anonymization and its risks under CQ-attack
3.1 Mix-zone concepts
A mix-zone of k participants refers to a k-anonymizaton region in which users can
change their pseudonyms such that the mapping between their old and new pseudonyms
is not revealed. In a mix-zone, a set of k users enter in some order and change
pseudonyms but none leave before all users enter the mix-zone. Inside the mix-zone,
the users do not report their locations and they exit the mix-zone in an order different
from their order of arrival, thus, providing unlinkability between their entering and
exiting events. The properties of a mix-zone can be formally stated as follows:
Definition 1 A mix-zone Z is said to provide k-anonymity to a set of users A iff
1. The set A has k or more members, i.e., jAj  k.
2. All users in Amust enter the mix-zone Z before any user i 2 A exits. Thus, there
exists a point in time where all k users of A are inside the zone.
3. Each user i 2 A, entering the mix-zone Z through an entry point ei 2 E and
leaving at an exit point oi 2 O, spends a completely random duration of time
inside.
4. The probability of transition between any point of entry to any point of exit fol-
lows a uniform distribution. i.e., a user entering through an entry point, e 2 E, is
equally likely to exit in any of the exit points, o 2 O.
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Figure 1(a) shows a mix-zone with three users entering with pseudonyms a, b and
c and exiting with new pseudonyms, p, q and r. Here, given any user exiting with
a new pseudonym, the adversary has equal probability of associating it with each
of the old pseudonyms a, b and c and thus the mix-zone provides an anonymity of
k = 3. Therefore, the uncertainty of an adversary to associate a new pseudonym of
an outgoing user i0 to its old pseudonym is captured by Entropy, H(i0) which is the
amount of information required to break the anonymity.
H(i0) =  
X
j2A
pi0!j  log2(pi0!j)
where pi0!j denotes the probability of mapping the new pseudonym, i0 to an old
pseudonym, j. Here note that when users change pseudonyms inside mix-zones along
their trajectories, an adversary observing them loses the ability to track their move-
ments.
Unlike the theoretical mix-zones, mix-zones constructed at road intersections
(Figure 1(b)) may violate some conditions. For instance, in a road network mix-
zone, users do not stay random time inside while entering and exiting the mix-zone
[15,29] and also violate the assumption of uniform transition probabilities in taking
turns. Such violations provide additional information to the adversary in inferring the
mapping between the old and new pseudonyms. Precisely,the timing information of
users entry and exit in a road network mix-zone leads to timing attack and the non-
uniformity in the transition probabilities at the road intersection leads to transition
attack respectively. The MobiMix road network mix-zone model (Definition 2) and
the construction techniques [29] deal with the challenges of constructing road net-
work mix-zones that are resilient to such timing and transition attacks. Accordingly
a road network mix-zone is defined as:
Definition 2 A road network mix-zone offers k-anonymity to a set A of users if and
only if:
1. There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
2. Given any two users i; j 2 A and assuming i exiting at time t, the pairwise
entropy after timing attack should satisfy the condition:Hpair(i; j)  .
3. Given any two users i; j 2 A, the pairwise entropy after transition attack should
satisfy the condition: Hpair(i; j)  .
Here the pairwise entropy, Hpair(i; j) between two users i and j represents the
entropy obtained by considering i and j to be the only members of the anonymity
set. In comparison, a theoretical mix-zone offers a high pairwise entropy of 1 for
all pairs of users. Therefore, a good road network mix-zone would offer a pairwise
entropy close to 1 for all pairs of users in the anonymity set. The non-rectangular
road network mix-zone geometry (Figure 1(c)) proposed in [29] enables each user to
travel along only one road segment inside the mix-zone and thereby avoids timing
attack due to difference in speed distributions. Similarly, the MobiMix road network
mix-zone model discusses the necessary criteria to ensure transition attack resilience
in the mix-zone construction process. However as we discuss next, when users run
continuous queries, any type of mix-zone is prone to CQ-attacks.
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3.2 CQ-attack
When a user is executing a continuous query, even though her pseudonym is changed
whenever she enters a road network mix-zone, an adversary may simply utilize the
consecutive snapshots of the query to reveal the correlation between the old and
new pseudonyms. Consider the example in Figure 1(a) where three users enter with
pseudonyms a, b and c and exit with new pseudonyms p, q and r. The attacker finds
that before entering the mix-zone, users a and b run continuous queries on obtain-
ing nearest drug store and shortest path driving directions to the airport respectively.
Upon their exits, the attacker again finds more instances of their corresponding con-
tinuous queries with different pseudonyms, q and r. Here, although users a and c
change their pseudonyms to q and r, the continuous exposure of their CQ informa-
tion breaks their anonymity. Similar attack can happen in a road network mix-zone as
shown in Figure 1(b) where three users with pseudonyms, a, b and c enter and leave
the mix-zone. As users a and b are running continuous queries, the attacker finds an
instance of a0s continuous query before entering the mix-zone and when user a exits
with a new pseudonym, say  and receives another instance of the same query, the at-
tacker infers that the new pseudonym  must correspond to the old pseudonym a. To
the best of our knowledge, no existing road network mix-zone technique is effective
against CQ-attack. For instance, we find in Figure 1(c) that even the non-rectangular
mix-zone [29] that is most effective against road network timing attack is also prone
to the CQ-attack.
Anonymity under CQ-attack model:When a user executes a continuous query,
it induces a trajectory corresponding to the movement of the user even though the
user’s pseudonym is changed whenever she crosses a road network mix-zone. When
a mobile user starts a continuous query from a personal location like office or home
address, then the user’s trajectory induced by the continuous query can be easily
linked with the user’s personal location and hence to user’s real identity even though
the pseudonyms are changed time to time. Therefore, in the proposed mix-zone
anonymization model, any mobile user who wishes to obtain CQ service first moves
to the nearest mix-zone and starts to run the CQ service from the mix-zone. Consider
the user with pseudonym, a in Figure 2 who wants to start a CQ service for obtaining
k-nearest drug stores. User a first goes to the nearest mix-zone and starts the first
instance of the query after exiting the mix-zone with a new pseudonym e. Here, the
attacker becomes confused to associate this continuous query with the users fa; b; cg
who entered the mix-zone as each of them have equal likelihood of starting this con-
tinuous query. Hence the continuous query obtains an initial anonymity of k = 3.
However, it should be noted that at the subsequent mix-zones, the query correlation
reveals the mapping between the old and new pseudonyms of the continuous query.
For example, in the second mix-zone the mapping between new pseudonym j and old
pseudonym e is revealed and similarly in the third mix-zone, the mapping between
new pseudonym m and old pseudonym j is revealed. Thus, the anonymity strengths
of the mix-zones is weakened under the continuous query correlation attack model.
In contrast, if users in the system ask only snapshot queries, then user a’s anonymity
keeps on increasing as a traverses through more mix-zones as it does not run contin-
uous queries. For example, when user a changes its pseudonym from e to j in the
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second mix-zone, its anonymity increases from k = 3 (corresponding to fa; b; cg) to
k = 5 (corresponding to fa; b; c; f; gg). Hence, even though the initial anonymity is
low (k = 3), in the snapshot query model, the anonymity gained in the intermediate
mix-zones add to the user’s anonymity. However for a continuous query, its initial
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Fig. 2: CQ-induced trajectory
anonymity forms the major component and intermediate mix-zones add anonymity
only when users in the intermediate mix-zones ask the same query. For instance, if
m out of the k users traversing an intermediate mix-zone run continuous queries and
if there are R number of unique continuous queries run by the m users and if Ar is
the set of users running the continuous query, Qr, 1  r  R, then the entropy of
each continuous query user, i executing the query, Qr and exiting the mix-zone with
a new pseudonym, i0 is given by
H(i) =  
X
j2Ar
pi0!j  log2(pi0!j)
where pi0!j denotes the probability of mapping the user exiting with the new pseudonym,
i0 to an old pseudonym, j that runs the same continuous query. Therefore, for a user
starting to execute a CQ from mix-zone m1, if fi users out of the mi continuous
query users in the ith mix-zone execute the same CQ, then the entropyX of the user
executing the continuous query is given by
X = logjk1  m1j+
X
2in
logjfij
where logjk1   m1j represents the initial anonymity of the user while starting the
continuous query in mix-zone,m1.
The goal for designing CQ-attack resilient solutions is to increase the anonymity
strengths of the mix-zones by considering the fact that the attacker has the continuous
query correlation information at the intermediate mix-zones to infer and associate the
CQ induced trajectory with its user. Note that the initial anonymity forms the major
component of the anonymity under the CQ-attack model and therefore it is impor-
tant that the mix-zones provide high initial anonymity for the continuous queries
so that even when the attacker breaks the anonymity in the subsequent mix-zones,
the initial anonymity remains sufficient to meet the required privacy level. For in-
stance, if the first mix-zone in the above example provides a higher anonymity, say
k = 100 instead of k = 3, then the initial anonymity may be sufficient to meet the
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privacy requirements of the continuous query even though the attacker breaks the
anonymity obtained in the intermediate mix-zones under the CQ-attack model. In the
next sub-section, we discuss CQ-cloaking techniques (spatial cloaking or temporal
cloaking of CQs) over road network mix-zones as a candidate approach for achieving
higher query anonymity and show that it is ineffective and susceptible to attacks that
combine CQ information with timing correlation (CQ-timing attack) and transition
correlation (CQ-transition attack).
3.3 CQ-cloaking approach and its vulnerabilities
In the CQ-cloaking approach, the continuous queries are either temporally or spatially
perturbed while the snapshot queries continue to be unperturbed. In the CQ-cloaking
approach, the locations used by the CQ is perturbed such that a continuous query
originating from a mix-zone is indistinguishable from at least k users traversing the
mix-zone. While this technique does not make changes to the mix-zone model, we
show that the location exposure of snapshot queries makes the CQ anonymization
susceptible to CQ-timing attack and CQ-transition attack.
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Fig. 3: Continuous Query: Timing and Transition attacks
Consider the example shown in Figure 3(a) where we have two CQs labeled as
star CQ and triangle CQ respectively. The square nodes represent road network mix-
zones. We observe two different CQ traces starting from the mix-zone at road junction
n6. The triangle trace crossed the junctions n6, n5 and n2 and the star trace crossed
the junctions n6, n5 and n9 respectively and each star or triangle represents one
snapshot execution of the corresponding CQ. Intuitively, if we delay the execution of
the individual CQ snapshots of CQ users starting at mix-zone n6 such that at least
kc users leave the mix-zone within the temporal delay, it will make it harder for an
adversary to associate the CQ-induced trajectory with the corresponding CQ user.
For instance, in Figure 3(a), if the continuous query on the shortest path to the airport
(marked by stars) originating from the mix-zone n6 is perturbed temporally in such
a way that there are k or more users coming out of the mix-zone at road junction
n6 within the continuous query’s temporal cloaking window, then from the attacker’s
perspective, the query could have originated from any of the k users who entered
the mix-zone within the time window. CQ-spatial cloaking is similar to CQ-temporal
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cloaking except that instead of delaying the snapshots of the continuous queries, the
CQ exposes a larger spatial region such that there are k or more users within the
spatial region.
CQ-timing Attack: As mentioned earlier, CQ-cloaking techniques are vulner-
able to CQ-timing attack when users in the anonymity set violate the steady motion
assumption, i.e., if all users do not travel at the imposed speed of the road segment. In
the example shown in Figure 3(b), we find that users with pseudonyms a, b, c, d, e, f ,
g and h enter the mix-zone during the continuous query’s temporal cloaking window,
dtmax. When the steady motion assumption fails, user a travels slowly and stays on
segment n5n6 while other users move ahead of the segment, n5n6. If user a is the is-
suer of the continuous query, then the continuous query would stay on segment, n5n6
even though it is executed with a temporal delay while other users of the anonymity
set move ahead. By observing this, the attacker can eliminate the low probable mem-
bers and identify the issuer of the continuous query with high confidence. Concretely,
we assume the attacker has knowledge of the maximum temporal delay, dtmax used
by the users. Let AC(i) represents the anonymity set of the continuous query, Ci, for
each user, j 2 AC(i) and letMCi;j be the likelihood that the continuous query orig-
inates from user j. Since only continuous query’s location is temporally perturbed,
the attacker observes the movement of the users through their location exposure for
snapshot queries. Let loc(j; t) and loc(Ci; t) represent the location of user j and the
location of the temporally cloaked continuous query, Ci observed by the attacker at
time t. If Xt dtj (loc(Ci; t)) is a Boolean variable indicating if the attacker observed
user j moving through the location, loc(Ci; t) at time t  dt, the likelihoodMCi;j is
given by
MCi;j =
X
0dtdtmax
q(Ci; dt)Xt dtj (loc(Ci; t))
where q(Ci; dt) denotes the probability that the continuous query, Ci uses a temporal
lag dt. Based on the proportion of the likelihoods of the users, the attacker can assign
the probability, QCi;j that represents the probability of user j to be source of the
continuous query, Ci.
QCi;j =
MCi;jP
j2A(Ci)MCi;j
Based on the probabilities, the attacker may either ignore the low probable members
from consideration or narrow down the search to the high probable members. We
note that similar attack is also possible in the case of CQ-spatial cloaking when the
steady motion assumption fails.
CQ-transition Attack: Additionally, CQ-cloaking techniques are also prone to
CQ-transition attack. When the transitions taken by a subset of the users in the
anonymity set differ from that of the user executing the query, then those members
can be eliminated based on transition correlation. For example, in Figure 3(c), at road
intersection n5, users c and e and h take a left turn on to the road segment, n2n5
whereas users b, f and g move straight on segment, n4n5 and users a and d turn
right on to segment, n5n9. When the continuous query uses CQ-temporal cloaking
or CQ-spatial cloaking and follows the querying user after a temporal delay or us-
ing a spatial cloaking region, from the transition taken by the continuous query from
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segment, n6n5 to n4n5, the adversary will be able to eliminate the users, c, e, h, b, f
and g from consideration as their transitions differ from that of the continuous query.
Concretely, if Yj is a Boolean variable indicating if the path taken by user j is the
same as that of the continuous query, Ci, then the probability QCi;j of user j being
the source of the continuous query, Ci is given by
QCi;j =
(
1P
j2A(Ci) Yj
if Yj = 1
0 otherwise
In the next section, we introduce the concept of delay-tolerant mix-zones that use
a modified mix-zone model to perform both location mixing and identity mixing to
achieve higher anonymity for continuous queries as compared to only identity mixing
in the conventional mix-zone model. Delay -tolerant mix-zones perturb both contin-
uous queries and snapshot queries and are free from CQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks.
4 Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
Delay-tolerant mix-zones combine mix-zone based identity privacy protection with
location mixing to achieve high anonymity that is otherwise not possible with con-
ventional mix-zones. In the delay-tolerant mix-zone model, users expose spatially
or temporally perturbed locations outside the mix-zone area. However, on the exit
of each delay tolerant mix-zone, the mix-zone changes their perturbed locations by
introducing a random temporal or spatial shift to their already perturbed locations.
While conventional mix-zones only change pseudonyms inside them, the additional
ability of delay-tolerant mix-zones to change and mix user locations brings greater
opportunities for creating anonymity.1 Therefore, the anonymity strength of delay-
tolerant mix-zones comes from a unique combination of both identity mixing and
location mixing.
Before presenting the detailed analysis of the privacy strengths of the delay-
tolerant mix-zones, we first illustrate the concept of delay-tolerant mix-zones with
an example temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone. Table 1 shows the entry and exit time
of users in a conventional rectangular road network mix-zone. We find that user a
enters the mix-zone as t = 100 and exits at time t = 104. Similarly the other users
enter and exit as shown in Table 1. Here the adversary may know that the average
time taken by the users to cross the mix-zone is 4 sec. Therefore when user a exits at
a0 at time t = 104, the attacker can eliminate users e and f from consideration as they
have not even entered the mix-zone by the time user a exits2. Similarly, the adversary
can eliminate users o and n from consideration based on timing inference that users
o and n have exited the mix-zone by the time a and b enter the mix-zone. Therefore
1 This model is analogous to anonymous delay-tolerant routing in mix networks where network routers
have the additional flexibility to create anonymity by delaying and reordering incoming packets before
forwarding them [31].
2 For the sake of example simplicity, we assume that the users take the average time of 4 sec to cross
the mix-zone, in a real road intersection, it could actually take slightly longer or shorter time to cross based
on the speed of travel.
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when a exits as a0, the attacker has uncertainty only among the users fa; b; c; d;mg.
Also, among the users fa; b; c; d;mg, the attacker can eliminate more users through
sophisticated reasoning based on timing inference described later.
User tin tinside tout
o 94 4 98
n 96 4 100
m 98 4 102
a 100 4 104
b 101 4 105
c 103 4 107
d 103 4 107
e 106 4 110
f 108 4 112
Table 1: Conventional Road Network Mix-zone
User Observed tin tinside dtold dtnew Observed
tout
w 81 4 4 20 105
v 84 4 7 20 108
u 84 4 7 20 108
s 87 4 10 20 111
r 89 4 12 20 113
q 90 4 13 20 114
p 92 4 15 20 116
o 94 4 18 20 118
n 96 4 19 20 120
m 98 4 20 18 120
a 100 4 4 16 120
b 101 4 4 15 120
c 103 4 7 13 120
d 103 4 7 13 120
e 106 4 10 10 120
f 108 4 12 8 120
g 109 4 13 7 120
h 111 4 15 5 120
i 113 4 18 3 120
j 115 4 19 1 120
k 117 4 20 0 120
l 118 4 20 0 121
Table 2: An example temporal Delay-tolerant mixing
However, in the delay-tolerant mix-zone model, each user uses a temporal delay,
dt within some maximum tolerance, dtmax. Inside the mix-zone, the temporally per-
turbed location of each user is assigned a random temporal shift. In the delay-tolerant
mix-zone example shown in Table 2, we find that user a initially uses a temporal
delay, dtold of 4 sec and inside the mix-zone it is shifted randomly to 16 sec. Here
dtmax is assumed as 20 sec. Therefore when user a exits as a0, it becomes possible
that many users can potentially exit in the exit time of user a. The example in Table 2
shows one possible assignment of new temporal delays, dtnew for other users in order
for them to exit at the same time as a0. Thus, during the exit of user a as a0, the at-
tacker is confused to associate the exiting user a0 with the members of the anonymity
set, fa; b; c; d; e; f; g; h; i; j; k;m; ng. In principle, users’ new temporal delays, dtnew
are randomly shifted inside the mix-zone ensuring the possibility of each of the users
to exit at the exit time of each other and thus the delay-tolerant mix-zone model pro-
vides significantly higher anonymity compared to conventional mix-zones. Such high
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anonymity provides the initial anonymity required for the continuous queries under
the CQ-attack model.
Timing attack in delay-tolerant mix-zone: Before we proceed to analyze the
privacy strengths of the delay-tolerant mix-zone, we formally define the timing at-
tack described above. The attacker observes the time of entry, tin(i) and time of exit
tout(i) for each user entering and exiting the mix-zone. When the attacker sees an
user i0 exiting, he tries to map i0 to one of the users of the anonymity set, Ai. The
attacker assigns a probability, pi0!j that corresponds to the probability of mapping
i0 to j, where j 2 A based on the likelihood of user j exiting at the exit time of
i0, denoted by tout(i0). Once the mapping probabilities are computed, the attacker
can utilize the skewness in the distribution of the mapping probabilities to elimi-
nate some low probable mappings from consideration and narrow down his infer-
ence to only the high probable mappings. Consider the example shown in Table 1
for the conventional mix-zone case, when user a exits as a0, we have the anonymity
set, A = fa; b; c; d; e; f;o; n;mg. Clearly the probability of mapping a0 to the users
fe; f; o; ng is zero as they either enter the mix-zone after a0 exits or leave the mix-
zone before a even enters. However, between the users fa; b; c; d;mg, the attacker can
assign a non-zero likelihood of resembling a0 as they have been inside the mix-zone
while awas present. Let these likelihoods be 0.37, 0.35, 0.1, 0.1 and 0.12 respectively.
In this case, we show that it is easy to analyze the anonymity based on pairwise en-
tropy. The pairwise entropy, Hpair(a; b) between two users a and b during the exit
of a0 is the entropy obtained by considering a and b to be the only members of the
anonymity set. In this case, we have two mapping probabilities, pa0!a and pa0!b
which are computed as: : pa0!a = 0:370:37+0:35 = 0:513, pa0!b =
0:35
0:37+0:35 = 0:486.
Hence the pairwise entropyH(a; b) is given by
Hpair(a; b) =  (pa0!alogpa0!a + pa0!blogpa0!b)
Therefore, Hpair(a; b) = 0.99. In general, a mix-zone defines a short mix-zone time
window,  such that a set of users entering within the short time window,  have
high pairwise entropy with each other. In the above example, if we take  = 1 sec,
then we find users a and b enter within 1 sec and hence they have high pairwise
entropy close to 1. However, users a and c do not enter within the mix-zone time
window of 1 sec and therefore we find that their pairwise entropy is lower(Hpair(a; c)
= 0.75 ). In comparison, a theoretical mix-zone (recall Definition 1) ensures a uniform
distribution for all possible mappings between old and new pseudonyms and therefore
ensures a high pairwise entropy of 1.0 for all pairs of users in the anonymity set. Thus,
the effective anonymity set of a road network is assumed to comprise of only those
users that have high pairwise entropy with each other.
Definition 3 A delay-tolerant road network mix-zone offers k-anonymity to a set A
of users if and only if:
1. There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
2. Given any two users i; j 2 A and assuming i exiting at time t, the pairwise
entropy after timing attack should satisfy the condition:Hpair(i; j)  .
3. Given any two users i; j 2 A, the pairwise entropy after transition attack should
satisfy the condition: Hpair(i; j)  .
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In the above example, only users fa; bgwill belong to the effective anonymity set of a
under the conventional mix-zone model as only they have high pairwise Entropy with
each other. However as discussed earlier, under the delay-tolerant mix-zone model
more number of users (fa; b; c; d; e; f; g; h; i; j; k;m; ng) will have high pairwise en-
tropy with each other and belong to the anonymity set of user a. Here, in addition
to the pairwise entropy with respect to timing attack, the pairwise entropy with re-
spect to transition attack is also considered for cases where the road intersections
do not have uniform transition probabilities to different segments (Condition 3). In
such cases, the effective anonymity set will contain only those members who enter
from road segments such that their transition probability to the exit segment of user
a is similar to the transition probability of their exit segments. As the delay-tolerant
mix-zones primarily influence the impact of timing attack, we focus our discussion
based on timing attack. However, in our experiments using real road networks, we
take into account the fact that road intersections do not have uniform transition prob-
ability and accordingly construct the anonymity set with only those members which
have similar transition probability as discussed in [29]. Next, we present the design
and formal analysis of three proposed delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques namely
(i)temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, (ii) spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones and (iii)
spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones.
4.1 Temporal Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
As discussed before, in a temporal delay tolerant mix-zone, every mobile user delays
the location exposure with a randomly chosen delay, dt within the maximum temporal
tolerance, dtmax. The temporal time window, dtmax is chosen based on the arrival
rate of the users in the road junction so as to ensure an expected number of users
arriving into the mix-zone within the temporal tolerance, dtmax. Note that the random
delay used by a mobile client does not change during its travel between mix-zones.
Only when the mobile client enters a new mix-zone, its temporal delay is randomly
shifted to a new value within the temporal window, dtmax. Based on the delayed
exposure of users’ location information, the attacker knows their current temporally
cloaked location.
Based on the temporally cloaked location exposed by the users, the adversary
observes each user i entering the mix-zone at a temporally cloaked time tcloakin(i)
and exiting at a temporally cloaked time tcloakout(i0) with a new pseudonym i0.
The speed followed by the users in a road segment is assumed to follow a Gaussian
distribution with a mean  and standard deviation , where  and  are specific to
each road class category. For user i, the set of all other users who had entered the mix-
zone during the time window defined by jtcloakin(i)  dtj to jtcloakin(i)++dtj,
forms the anonymity set of i, denoted as Ai where  is a small value and represents
the mix-zone time window. Let t be the temporally cloaked exit time of user i, which
is also tcloakout(i0).
For each user, j in the anonymity set, Ai, we compute pi0!j , the probability that
the exiting user i0 at temporally cloaked time, tcloakout(i0) is j and pi0!i be the
probability that the exiting user is i. Let P (j; t) define the probability that user j exits
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the mix-zone at the cloaked time, t. Here, the observed movement of the temporally
cloaked user location in the mix-zone is controlled by two factors: the speed of the
user inside the mix-zone and the change in the temporal delay used by the user. Let
Pv(j; x) be numerically equal to the probability that user j takes x units of time
to traverse the mix-zone region. It is computed based on the speed distribution on
the road segments. Let Pt(j; t) be the probability that the temporal delay of user j is
shifted by t seconds after exiting the mix-zone. In order for user j to exit at temporally
cloaked time, tcloackout(i0), it depends on both the temporal shift introduced to user
j in the mix-zone as well as the time j takes to cross the mix-zone. Thus, P (j; t) is
given by
P (j; t) =
Z 1
0
Pv(j; x) Pt(j; t  tcloackin(j) + x)dx
Here we note that our temporal location mixing algorithm assigns a new temporal
delay, dtnew based on the current temporal delay, dt and the maximum temporal
delay, dtmax.
dtnew = jdtmax   dtj
and hence it ensures a uniform distribution of shift values, Pt(j; t)while also ensuring
that the temporal lags of the users are uniformly distributed. Similar to P (j; t), we
can also obtain P (i; t) based on the temporally cloaked arrival time of i, tcloackin(i).
We have
P (i0; t) = P (i; t) + P (j; t)
Here, P (i0; t) is the cumulative likelihood of both i or j exiting as i0 as i0 is either
of them. Therefore, the probability of i0 being j when i0 exits at time t, denoted as
pi0!j(t) is given by the following conditional probability
pi0!j(t) = P ((j; t)=(i0; t))
Similarly, the probability of i0 being i, pi0!i(t) is given by
pi0!i(t) = P ((i; t)=(i0; t))
and the pair-wise entropy after timing attack,Hpair(i; j) between users i and j when
i exits as i0 can be obtained as
Hpair(i; j) =  (pi0!i(t)logpi0!i(t) + pi0!j(t)logpi0!j(t))
As it is intuitive, for an exiting user, i0, the number of users in the effective anonymity
set (i.e., those members that have high pairwise entropy with each other and with i0)
is directly proportional to the temporal tolerance, dtmax, ie., the greater the temporal
tolerance value, dtmax, the more the number of users that could possibly resemble
i during the exit of i0 with a high pairwise Entropy. Thus by varying the temporal
tolerance, dtmax the temporal delay tolerant-mix-zones can offer any desired level of
anonymity to the users.
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4.2 Spatial Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
We now present our second class of delay-tolerant mix-zones namely spatial delay-
tolerant mix-zones. Unlike the temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, in the spatial delay-
tolerant mix-zone approach, users’ locations are instantaneously sent out using a spa-
tial region instead of the exact point location. Here, the spatial region masks the exact
time of traversal of the user inside the mix-zone ensuring the possibility that the user
could be located at any point within the spatial region. This ensures that the adversary
can not infer the exact time of traversal of the user. The spatial region is constructed
by first identifying the temporal window size, dtmax based on the arrival rate of the
users in the mix-zone and by translating the user’s current location into a spatial re-
gion based on the temporal window size, dtmax. A spatial region corresponding to a
temporal window size dtmax includes all road segments that can be reached within
dtmax units of time (i.e., the corresponding dl units of length) from the center of the
region when travelled at the mean speed of the road segments. The delay-proportional
spatial cloaking algorithm described in Algorithm 1 computes the spatial region in
such a way that the distance from the center of the spatial region and the location
of the mobile user exactly corresponds to the spatial distance, dl proportional to the
temporal delay, dt of the user in the temporal delay-tolerant approach. Inside the
delay-tolerant mix-zone, the spatial regions of the users are randomly changed by
introducing a spatial shift.
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Fig. 4: Illustration of Delay-tolerant mix-zones
We illustrate the principle of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zone through an example
in Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b). Figure 4(a) shows the entry of the spatial regions of
users a, b, c and d into the mix-zone and Figure 4(b) illustrates the spatial location
mixing process. We find that the location mixing process changes the spatial regions
of the users, a, b, c and d in such a way that the distance of the users from the
center of their spatial region is randomly shifted (Notice changed distance in the
spatial regions in Figure 4(b)). Therefore, after the spatial location mixing process,
the spatial regions of users a, b, c and d all have similar probability to exit at a given
time. Note that without this spatial mixing, the attacker would still infer that the
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regions of a and b entered well ahead of c and d and hence a and b will exit before c
and d.
Algorithm 1 Delay-proportional Spatial Cloaking
1: dtmax: continuous query temporal window
2: v: vertex v corresponds to the road junction v
3: pathtimev : mean travel time to vertex v from starting mix-zone, if v is the mix-zone junction, then
pathtimev = 0
4: region: is a global list of road segments representing the cloaking region. It is empty at beginning
and represents the cloaking region when the algorithm terminates
5: procedure FINDCLOAKREGION(dtmax, pathtimev , v)
6: for all segments(v; u) 2 segs(v) do
7: pathtimeu = pathtimev +
length(v;u)
speed(v;u)
8: if (pathtimeu < dtmax) then
9: if (region:contains(v; u) == false) then
10: region:add(v; u)
11: FindCloakRegion(dtmax; pathtimeu; u)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end procedure
Here we assume that each user, i’s spatial region enter the mix-zone at time,
tin(region(i)) and exits at time tout(region(i)) with a new pseudonym, i0. For
each user, i, the set of other users whose spatial regions entered the mix-zone during
the time window defined by jtin(region(i))    j to jtin(region(i)) +  j forms the
anonymity set of i, denoted byAi. The anonymity obtained in the mix-zone is depen-
dent on the pairwise mapping probabilities, pi0!i and pi0!j where j 2 Ai and pi0!j
denotes the probability that the exiting user i0 at time, tout(region(i0)) is j and pi0!i
represents the probability that the exiting user is i.
The movement of a user’s spatial region is governed by two factors in a spatial
delay-tolerant mix-zone namely the randomness of the user movement in terms of
its velocity inside the mix-zone and the spatial shift introduced in the spatial region
after exiting the mix-zone. Let us assume that user j takes x units of time in the
mix-zone and let Pv(j; x; l) be the probability that user j travels with a velocity such
that it takes x units of time to cross l units of distance of the mix-zone region. Let
lmix be the distance to cross the mix-zone and let us assume that j’s spatial region
is shifted by y units of length in the location mixing process. Let Ps(j; y) denote
the probability that the spatial shift introduced in the mix-zone is y units of length.
Therefore, for user j to exit at time, tout(region(i0)), it should travel a distance of
lmix + y in the mix-zone instead of the usual distance lmix. Therefore, we have
P (j; t) =
Z 1
0
Pv(j; x; lmix + y) Ps(j; y)dx
where x = t   tin(region(j)). Here, the spatial location mixing process assigns a
new spatial region to each user ensuring a uniform distribution of spatial shift values,
18 Balaji Palanisamy, Ling Liu, Kisung Lee, Shicong Meng, Yuzhe Tang and Yang Zhou
Ps(j; y). i.e., inside the mix-zone, every user’s distance from the center of its spatial
region is shifted by a random length, y.
Similar to P (j; t), we can obtain P (i; t) and hence pi0!j(t), the probability of
i0 being j when i0 exits at time t can be obtained from the conditional probability,
pi0!j(t) = P ((j; t)=(i0; t)). Similarly, as discussed in section 4.1, the probability
of i0 being i, pi0!i(t) can be computed and thus the pair-wise entropy, Hpair(i; j; t)
between users i and j when i exits as i0 can be obtained.
We note that the spatial delay-tolerant mix-zone approach does not incur temporal
delays, however they lead to higher query processing cost that is directly proportional
to the size of the spatial regions. In the next subsection, we discuss spatio-temporal
delay-tolerant mix-zones that yield suitable tradeoffs between the incurred delay and
the cost of query processing.
4.3 Spatio-temporal delay-tolerant Mix-zones
In the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone approach, user locations are perturbed
using both a temporal delay as well as a spatial region instead of the exact point
location and the mix-zone introduces both random temporal and spatial shifts to the
spatio-temporally perturbed user locations. Therefore, to an adversary observing an
user, the user could have been located at any point in the spatial region at any instance
of time during the temporal time window.
The anonymity strength of this model is analyzed as follows. We assume that each
user uses a temporal time window of dtmax and a spatial cloaking region of length,
dlmax. Based on the delayed exposure of the spatial regions, the attacker estimates
the current temporally perturbed position of the spatial region of each user’s location.
Here we assume that each user, i’s spatial region, region(i), enters the mix-zone at
a temporally cloaked time, tcloakin(region(i)) and exits at a temporally cloaked
time, tcloakout(region(i)) with a new pseudonym, i0. For user i, the set of all other
users whose spatial regions entered the mix-zone during the mix-zone time window
defined by jtcloakin(region(i))     dtj to jtcloakin(region(i)) +  + dtj, forms
the anonymity set of i, namely Ai.
In a spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone, the movement of a user’s spatio-
temporally perturbed location is governed by three factors: (i) the randomness of
user’s movement inside the mix-zone determined by velocity, (ii) the random tem-
poral shift introduced inside the mix-zone and (iii) the random spatial shift intro-
duced inside the mix-zone. For all j 2 Ai, let us assume that user j’s spatial region,
region(j) takes x units of time to cross the mix-zone and let Pv(j; x; l) be the prob-
ability that user j travels with a velocity such that it takes x units of time to cross l
units of distance of the mix-zone region and let j’s spatial region be shifted by y units
of length and its temporal delay be shifted by z units of time. Let Ps(j; y) denote the
probability that the spatial shift introduced in the mix-zone is x units of length and
Pt(j; z) be the probability that the temporal delay of user j is shifted by z seconds
after exiting the mix-zone. Therefore, for user j’s spatial region, region(j) to exit
at temporally cloaked time, tout(region(i0)), it should travel a distance of lmix + y
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in the mix-zone instead of the usual lmix where lmix is the length of the mix-zone
region. Therefore,
P (j; t) =
Z 1
0
Pv(j; x; lmix + y)
Ps(j; y) Pt(j; t  tcloackin(j) + x)dxdy
Here we note that the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone introduces both
random temporal and spatial shifts inside and thus it ensures a uniform random dis-
tribution of Ps(j; y) and Pt(j; t  tcloackin(j) + x) in the above equation.
Thus, the pair-wise entropy between users i and j when i exits as i0 can be ob-
tained after knowing the probabilities pi0!i(t) and pi0!j(t) which are deduced from
P (i; t) and P (j; t) similar to the analysis on temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones in
section 4.1
5 Experimental Evaluation
We divide the experimental evaluation of our techniques into three components: (i)
the effectiveness of the proposed techniques under the CQ-attack model, (ii) perfor-
mance in terms of query processing cost, incurred temporal delays and success rate
of anonymization and (iii) evaluation of the spatio-temporal tradeoffs between in-
curred temporal delays and query processing cost. Before reporting our experimental
results, we first describe the experimental setup, including the road-network mobile
object simulator used in the experiments.
5.1 Experimental setup
We use the GT Mobile simulator [28] to generate a trace of cars moving on a real-
world road network, obtained from maps available at the National Mapping Division
of the USGS [2]. The simulator extracts the road network based on three types of
roads   expressway, arterial and collector roads. Our experimentation uses maps
from three geographic regions namely that of Chamblee and Northwest Atlanta re-
gions of Georgia and San Jose West region of California to generate traces for a two
hour duration. We generate a set of 10,000 cars on the road network that are ran-
domly placed on the road network according to a uniform distribution. Cars generate
random trips with source and destination chosen randomly and shortest path routing
is used to route the cars for the random trips. The speed of the cars are distributed
based on the road class categories as shown in Table 3.
5.2 Experimental results
Our experimental evaluation consists of three parts. First, we evaluate the effective-
ness of the proposed techniques in terms of their anonymization effectiveness. We
compare the delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques with CQ-cloaking techniques and
conventional road network mix-zones in terms of the obtained entropy that captures
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Road type Expressway Arterial Collector
Mean speed(mph) 60 50 25
Std. dev.(mph) 20 15 10
Speed Distribution Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
Table 3: Motion Parameters
Parameter Value
Map Northwest Atlanta region
Mobility Model Random Roadnet Router
Total number of vehicles 10000
Number of Road junctions 6831
Number of Road segments 9187
Table 4: Simulation Parameters and Setting
the amount of information required to break the anonymity and then compare the var-
ious delay-tolerant mix-zones in terms of the average temporal delays incurred and
the cost of query processing in terms of query processing time. Next, we evaluate the
spatio-temporal tradeoffs of delay-tolerant mix-zones that helps understand the best
tradeoffs in terms of the incurred temporal delay and the query processing time. Our
final set of experiments evaluate the effectiveness of the delay-tolerant mix-zones in
terms of the average temporal delays, query execution time and success rate in pro-
viding the desired value of k. Our default setting uses the map of Northwest Atlanta
that has 6831 road junctions and 9187 road segments as shown in table 4. Among the
6831 junctions in the road network, 1025 (15 %) road junctions are chosen as the can-
didate mix-zones and the experimental results are averaged among these mix-zones.
By default, each delay-tolerant mix-zone is constructed over a non-rectangular road
network mix-zone with pairwise Entropy lowerbound after timing attack,  taken as
0.9 so that the effective anonymity set of the mix-zone comprises only of users who
have pairwise Entropy greater than 0.9 with each other. Similarly for comparison,
each conventional mix-zone is also constructed using the non-rectangular geometry
with  = 0:9. For both delay-tolerant mix-zones and conventional mix-zones, the
pairwise Entropy lowerbound  after transition attack is taken as 0.9. We assume
that all continuous queries are unique and by default 10% of users in the system run
continuous queries.
5.2.1 Comparison with Conventional Mix-zones and CQ-cloaking
This set of experiments compares the delay-tolerant mix-zone approaches with the
conventional mix-zones and CQ-cloaking techniques in terms of their anonymity
measured by Entropy. Here, the delay-tolerant mix-zones are constructed over a con-
ventional road network mix-zone whose size is chosen to offer an anonymity of 4. In
Figure 5(a), we compare the average entropy of the temporal, spatial and spatio-
temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone approaches (t-M, s-M, and st-M) with the con-
ventional mix-zone approach and the temporal and spatial CQ-cloaking approaches
(CQ-t and CQ-s) for various values of required anonymity, k. Here, the temporal
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Fig. 5: Comparison with Conventional Mix-zones
window and spatial region size are chosen based on the arrival rate of the users in
the mix-zones to ensure the required number of users, k with a high probability,
p = 0:9. For the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, the spatial region size is
fixed as 800 m and the temporal window is varied according to the required value
of k. We find that the average entropy of the conventional mix-zone approach is sig-
nificantly lower than that of the delay-tolerant mix-zones as they can not adapt to
higher levels of anonymity but the delay-tolerant mix-zones always provide the re-
quired anonymity level for all values of k as shown by the high Entropy. Here, we
also note that the CQ-cloaking approaches (CQ-t and CQ-s) have low level of Entropy
due to the effect of CQ-timing and CQ-transition attacks. In Figure 5(b) and Figure
5(c), we plot the timeline of the Entropy obtained by continuous queries (CQ) and
snapshot queries (SQ) respectively. Here, we use the spatio-temporal mix-zone as the
candidate delay-tolerant mix-zone and temporal CQ-cloaking as the candidate CQ-
cloaking technique. We find that with conventional mix-zones, the continuous queries
obtain low initial anonymity and it stays constant throughout the timeline. With the
CQ-cloaking approach, the queries obtain higher anonymity in the beginning but their
anonymity is gradually reduced due to the impact of CQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks. However, the delay-tolerant mix-zones offer very high anonymity to meet
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the privacy requirements of the continuous queries under the CQ-attack model. For
snapshot queries, we find that the techniques have a different trend as shown in Fig-
ure 5(c). The conventional mix-zone model shows an increasing Entropy timeline
where users gain more anonymity at the intermediate mix-zones as CQ-attack has
no impact on snapshot queries. We also find that the delay-tolerant mix-zone offers
greater anonymity to snapshot queries with a much steeper Entropy timeline but the
CQ-cloaking technique offers only similar anonymity as the conventional mix-zone.
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Fig. 6: Performance of Continuous and SnapShot queries
5.2.2 Performance of Continuous and Snapshot queries
Next, we study the performance impact of the proposed approaches for continuous
and snapshot queries individually. We measure the average temporal delay incurred
and the average query execution time of the techniques in figure 6(a) and 6(b). Here,
all queries are anonymized corresponding to a k = 50. The spatio-temporal delay-
tolerant mix-zone uses its default spatial region size of 800 m. The query execution
time represents the average time to process a snapshot of a k-NN query for a k-
nearest neighbor value of (kq = 7) over 14000 uniformly distributed objects on the
road network using the road network based anonymous query processor described
in [32]. We find that with the CQ-temporal cloaking (CQ-t), only the continuous
queries incur delay before getting processed and in CQ-spatial cloaking (CQ-s), nei-
ther of the queries incurs any delay. With the spatial cloaking approach, we obtain the
results of the query for all possible locations within the cloaking region, however the
continuous queries in the CQ-spatial cloaking approach result in higher query execu-
tion time. In temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones (t-M), both continuous and snapshot
queries incur temporal delays but have low query execution time. Conversely, the
spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones (s-M) do not incur any delays for the queries but
have increased query execution time for both snapshot and continuous queries. The
spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones technique (st-M) finds a tradeoff between
these approaches and has more than 55% lower average temporal delay compared to
the temporal cloaking case as well as a 40% lower query execution time compared to
the spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones.
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Fig. 7: Performance of delay-tolerant mix-zones
5.2.3 Evaluating Spatio-temporal tradeoff
Our next set of experiments compares the performance of the delay-tolerant mix-
zones in terms of the average temporal delays incurred and the query execution time
under various values of required anonymity, k. Figure 7(a) shows the average tem-
poral delay required to anonymize users for various anonymity levels. The X-axis
shows the anonymity offered by the conventional mix-zone and the Y-axis shows the
anonymity level offered by the delay-tolerant mix-zones constructed over the con-
ventional mix-zones and the Z-axis represents the average temporal delay, dt used
by the delay-tolerant mix-zones. We find that the temporal delay increases with in-
crease in the anonymity level of the delay-tolerant mix-zone. Also, we find that there
is only a small decrease in temporal delay with increase in mix-zone anonymity as
the temporal window has a significant impact on the obtained anonymity.
Similarly, we study the performance of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones in Figure
7(b). The X-axis represents the anonymity offered by the conventional road network
mix-zone and the Y-axis represents the anonymity of the delay-tolerant mix-zones.
We plot the required spatial resolution along Z-axis. We observe a similar trend with
spatial resolution values as with the temporal delay in Figure 7(a). We notice that
higher query anonymity levels require larger spatial cloaking regions for location
perturbation. In the context of delay-tolerant mix-zones, we measure the data quality
in terms of the size of the spatial region (spatial resolution) instead of the number
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Fig. 8: Comparison of Query Execution time
of objects as those in the location k-anonymized cloaking [13]. This is because the
spatial perturbation in a delay-tolerant mix-zone is focused on changing the pseudo-
identity with a higher anonymity rather than obtaining a perturbed location with a
k-anonymized cloaking region. However, we refer the interested readers to [13] for
additional object distribution based metrics for measuring data quality of the location
perturbation process.
Next, we study the spatio-temporal tradeoff between the spatial resolution that
determines query processing cost and the temporal delay incurred before processing
the query requests. In Figure 7(c), the spatial resolution value is varied along the
X-axis and the Y-axis represents the delay-tolerant mix-zone anonymity level. Here,
the conventional mix-zone anonymity is set as 12. We find that the average temporal
delay along Z-axis is much smaller with the effect of spatio-temporal perturbation
compared to the temporal and spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones. Higher spatial res-
olution greatly reduces the temporal window size required to provide the required
anonymity. However, the right trade-off between the temporal window size and the
spatial resolution can be made based on the acceptable delay in processing the user
queries and the desired cost of query processing.
Our next set of experiments compares the delay-tolerant mix-zones in terms of
their average query execution time. In Figure 8, the average query execution time to
process a snapshot of a k-NN query with (kq = 7) over 14000 uniformly distributed
objects on the road network is shown. In Figure 8(a), observe that the temporal delay-
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tolerant mix-zones incur very low query execution time (less than 1 msec) as these
queries use the point location of the mobile client with a temporal delay. Whereas,
the query execution time of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones in Figure 8(b) increases
with increase in the required anonymity as larger anonymity requires larger spatial
regions for processing. The query execution time of spatio-temporal delay-tolerant
mix-zone approach in 8(c) shows the reduction in the query processing cost at the
expense of the incurred temporal delay in processing the queries (Figure 7(c)).
5.2.4 Impact of fraction of Continuous Query users
The anonymity of the delay-tolerant mix-zones also depends on the fraction of total
users who run continuous queries. For instance, if a number of continuous queries
exist in the system, each uniquely identifying the querying user, the anonymization
process might result either in long temporal delays or large spatial regions leading
to higher query processing cost. The continuous query fraction denotes the frac-
tion of the total users who currently execute a continuous query. Here, each query is
anonymized with an anonymity, k = 50. In Figure 9(a), we measure the average tem-
poral delay incurred by the approaches for varying values of fraction of continuous
queries. We find that the average temporal delay of both (t-M) and (st-M) approaches
increases steadily with increase in the proportion of continuous queries till a point,
(0.6 in the figure) and then increases steeply indicating that it could be expensive
to anonymize continuous queries if more than 60% of the users execute continuous
queries. A similar trend is exhibited in Figure 9(b) for query processing cost sug-
gesting that the anonymization cost could be higher when the fraction of continuous
queries approaches 0.7. As a large number of mobile users are passive in general (i.e.,
execute no queries while traveling), we believe that a 60% continuous query fraction
of the entire user population is expected to be rarely crossed in practice.
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Fig. 9: Fraction of Continuous Query users
5.2.5 Success Rate and Relative-k
Our final set of experiments evaluates the performance of the delay-tolerant mix-
zones in terms of their success rate in providing the desired level of anonymity. The
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success rate represents the fraction of the cases where the proposed framework is
able to provide an anonymity equal or greater than the requested value, k. In Figure
10(a), the query anonymity level is varied along the X-axis and the Y-axis represents
the obtained success rate. Based on the arrival rate of the users in the mix-zone, the
expected success rate is chosen as 0.9 so that the delay-tolerant mix-zones provide
an anonymity of k or higher in more than 90% of the cases. We find that all the
delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques obtain a success rate close to the expected success
rate of 0.9, however the success rate of the CQ-cloaking approach is much lower
(less than 0.3) and the conventional mix-zone approach has a even lower success
rate of less than 0.06. Similarly, we study relative-k which is defined as the ratio of
the anonymity obtained by the queries to the query anonymity requested. In Figure
10(b), we find that the relative anonymity level of delay-tolerant mix-zones ranges
from 1.5 to 2.0 showing that the queries on an average obtain an anonymity which
is 1.5 to 2.0 times the requested value. The successfull cases of CQ-cloaking and
conventional mix-zone approaches have a lower relative anonymity as the mix-zones
have lower successrate and provides lower value of k in general. In order to evaluate
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the success rate under different fractions of continuous queries in the system, we
study the approaches by varying the fraction of users executing continuous queries.
Here, each query is anonymized with an anonymity of 50. Figure 11(a) shows that
the obtained success rate is close to the expected success rate for the delay-tolerant
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mix-zones across different fractions of CQs in the system. However, the CQ-cloaking
and conventional mix-zone techniques have much lower success rate. Similarly, the
success rate of the techniques is compared across different scales of geographic maps
described in section 5.1. We compare the success rate of spatio- temporal delay-
tolerant mix-zones in Figure 11(b) that shows that the technique performs well across
different geographic maps.
6 Conclusion
We presented a delay-tolerant mix-zone framework for protecting location privacy
of mobile users against continuous query correlation attacks. First, we described and
formally analyzed the mix-zone anonymization problem under the CQ-attack model
and showed that spatial cloaking or temporal cloaking over road network mix-zones
is ineffective and susceptible to CQ-timing and CQ -transition attacks. We introduced
three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones that are free from CQ-timing
and CQ-transition attacks and in contrast to conventional mix-zones, perform a com-
bination of both location mixing and identity mixing of spatially and temporally per-
turbed user locations to achieve stronger anonymity for the continuous queries un-
der the CQ-attack model. The temporal delay tolerant mix-zones perform temporal
location-mixing by introducing a random temporal shift and the spatial delay tol-
erant mix-zones perform spatial location-mixing through random spatial shifts. We
also showed that by combining temporal and spatial delay tolerant mix-zones, we
can make acceptable tradeoffs between anonymous query processing cost and tem-
poral delay incurred in anonymous query processing. Extensive experiments using
traces generated by GTMobiSim on different scales of geographic maps show that
the delay-tolerant mix-zones are effective under the CQ attack model and offer the re-
quired level of anonymity to the continuous queries. In future, we plan to investigate
the mix-zone anonymization under more sophisticated attack models that combine
prior background knowledge of the users travel patterns and personal locations along
with CQ information.
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